Should Everyone have a Right to their own Opinion?…

There are questions to which I am willing to provide answers with a relatively high degree of confidence. Then there are questions that I sorta have an opinion about– questions that I have an automatic reflex-like reaction in response to but that upon further consideration I would not profess a high degree of confidence in. The issue addressed in this post falls into the latter category. My monkey -mind thinks it has an opinion here, but when I try to think about it, I find myself quite undecided about it. Maybe writing about it will help.

An attempt at phrasing the question: What ought be our [ personal / social / institutional / etc. ] policy regarding community members who indicate at least one instance of what we consider to be a drastic doxastic flaw?

In other words, how do we feel about the cliche: Everyone has a right to their opinion.

I’ll let Drs. Dawkins and Tyson expand:

Dawkins: “… an American astrophysicist… this man writes learned articles in astronomical learned journals mathematical papers, and the mathematics is premised on the belief that the universe is between 13 and 14 billion years old. This man writes his papers, he does his mathematics and everything– he privately believes the world is only 6000 years old…

Let me take an even more extreme example, which is fictitious in this case. Imagine that you were going to consult a doctor. I’ll make him an eye doctor… but you happen to know that he privately doesn’t believe in the sex theory of reproduction, he believes that babies come from storks.

… or the professor of geography who believes in the flat earth… ”

We have examples of this general case: We’re sharing a community in some respect or other with individuals who profess a belief that “we” agree is somehow “beyond the pale”. Not only do we not share the belief, and not only do we find the belief unlikely; but a case in which you and I would agree to some sentiment that resembles “That belief is so unwarranted, that anyone [ of a type? ] who holds it… [ X ].” and a question is: What, if anything, can we insert for X in such cases?

Let us stipulate that D- and T- agree that “Believing Earth to be 6000 years old is beyond the pale [ for an astrophysicist ].” A further complication added by bracketed clauses of this type: Does, or in what ways does, one’s social role factor in when addressing questions of this type? At this point D- and T- provide us with examples of two general policy directions that I will characterize in my own terms below.

Censorious – We should impose social cost on doxastic reprobates within reason. [ e.g. “He should be fired!” ]

Libertarian – We should accommodate maximal doxastic freedom within reason. [ e.g. “I don’t care what he believes.” ]

Dawkins, in the video above, leans Censorious and Tyson leans Libertarian. Both, I think, and the present author as well, include a large amount of wiggle room in the “within reason” clause. For example, most Libertarian leaning folks will add a “… as long as it doesn’t effect his teaching in the classroom…” clause and most Censorious individuals will say “… well maybe he should be removed from his post but we shouldn’t hang him!”. I think on this sort of question, whatever answers we select will probably be somewhere in “the middle”. Yet, there is still a debate to be had as to which way we should tend, lean, err on the side of, etc.

Dawkins clearly leans in the direction of imposing costs on those who, under his description, “…have the kind of mind that’s so adrift from reality… that I don’t think he can be trusted.” He thinks that the institutions that employ these individuals should remove them from their positions. While Tyson tends toward the default position of, “I don’t care what [ silliness ] he believes…” as long as it doesn’t obviously or directly affect his current socially sanctioned tasks. They do not spend any time justifying the Libertarian position in this short clip, I think this is because this is the America-2018 default. I think we currently occupy a general social orientation reflected in the cliche “Everyone has a right to their own opinions.” as even our royalty knows:

The good Drs. do spend a few moments considering the Censorious position, and tentatively arrive for the moment at the picture that D- is holding it for a “principled” reason, which comes down to “consistency”.

To lay my cards on the table, the Chimp-y reaction that I have toward the cliche of the day that “Everyone has a right to their opinion” is: Fuck that! No! That’s how we end up with a world populated by so many insane people. Belief without high quality justification is the root of most ‘evil’! Our policy should be to impose a significant degree of social cost on our fellows who hold unwarranted opinions. We need to dispute their bullshit, we need to request more arguments; and to be a bit harsh on those who continue to hold positions / opinions / beliefs / etc. despite being unable to produce arguments in their favor. I want them to feel uncomfortable more often, in the hopes that this influences a greater degree of thoughtfulness and intellectual defense of opinions.

So, let’s look at this Censorious Chimp reaction more closely and see if it also has a reasonable argument. Let’s begin with a few prima facie generalities to set the stage:

I take it that these “trivialities” would be accepted by both Dawkins and Tyson, as well as most readers. Prosaically the claims are: Most people have some opinions, some well justified some less so, and these opinions can change often in light of social factors. Additionally, I think that our two professors and some readers [ though I realize I lose some at this step ] would accept this value statement:

Value) It is desirable that individual human beings hold justified opinions.

In order to derive a Censorious position from this agreement base, I think we need some premises like these:

Also, for more on this, check out T.D.P. E10: The Argument Argument.

That’s what I’ve got right now for an attempted argument in favor of my Chimp-y reaction. I must admit that I for one find it persuasive. But as mentioned, I don’t have a high degree of confidence here. I’m curious to hear from the rest of you what you think about this, comment below or email: dawdlersphilosophy@gmail.com

I actually don’t agree with Dawkins that these people should be fired from their positions. The social pressure I envision is more [ inter- ] personal. Imagine the situations of families at Thanksgiving dinner tables, all the disputes which end by a dismissive hand-flick gesture accompanied by “Well, everyone has a right to their own opinion”, “Reasonable people can disagree”, or “Isn’t this nice weather we’re having?”. I wonder how much better a place the world might be if more of our disputes either continued to resolution or ended with some more Censorious verbalization along the lines of, “Ok, but realize that you don’t have good justification for that opinion”, “If you want to walk around thinking that you owe the rest of a better argument”, or something along those lines.

So to answer the various versions of the question asked in this post my current thinking runs about like this:

How do we feel about the cliche “Everyone has a right to their opinion”?: That this is a dangerous social habit which facilitates a community more likely to have more members holding more unjustified opinions.

What ought be our policy towards “beyond the pale” doxological elements?: That we ought to both individually challenge them more often when we encounter them, and generally that we behave in such a manner as to move our society closer to a “You have a responsibility to justify your opinions” milieu.

What can we insert for ‘X’ in “That opinion is so unwarranted anyone who holds it… [ X ].”?: “… should be challenged to defend/argue in favor of their opinion.”

If I’m right that the world would be a ‘better’ place if more people had defensible opinions, and that moderately stringent verbal social pressure systems could create a set of habits which led to more people holding more defensible opinions more often– it seems that we should work to move in that direction. How does this opinion hold up?